I want to welcome you to Abilene on behalf of all of the Abilene members of the Philosophical Society. I want to express our appreciation to the folks that really helped us make this meeting possible, my assistants Beverly Guthrie and Angie Cook, and, of course, Ron Tyler, as well as Evelyn Stehling and Melinda Wilson of the TSHA, and the staff of the Embassy Suites, who have done everything they could to make things work smoothly. Again, I want to thank all the volunteers from Abilene that drove folks back and forth to Albany and to the Civic Center last night. So all of you all were very important in making this thing work well.
I had no idea two years ago, when we selected the topic for this discussion, that the Koreans would have launched a three-stage missile, or that India and Pakistan would have detonated a nuclear device, or that-well, you probably would have figured that Iraq was causing another problem. But today's topic really is not only timely, I think it's crucially important, because if history teaches us anything, it is that those nations that are focused, and committed and militarily strong are the survivors. Those that are divided by ethnic and religious tensions, ravaged by economic mismanagement, indifferent to education and the aspirations of tyrants abroad, those are the ones that don't survive. So today and tomorrow morning we will discuss these issues as they relate to protecting the United States.
America is not and can never be again isolationist. And as we say in West Texas, whether we like it or not, we've got a dog in almost every fight. When the Asian market collapsed and we looked at our stock portfolios, this became very clear to us. When we've completed our discussions on Sunday, each one of us will consider what we've learned, and then use it as we have the opportunity to benefit this state and nation.
Now, I'd like to introduce our moderator for the rest of our session. Abilene likes to claim Lee Butler as one of our own. We look at him as an Abilenian in exile. Lee came here as a bird colonel, commanding B-52 wing at Dyess Air Force Base. We quickly recognized that he was destined for stardom, as it turned out, as Commander of the Strategic Air Command. From 1991 to 1995, he served as the Commander in Chief of the Strategic Nuclear Forces for the United States. In this position, he was responsible for the deployment of the nation's nuclear bombers and ballistic missiles, both land and sea based, developing nuclear weapon target plans, and advising the President on response to nuclear attack on the United States. When he retired from active duty, he went into the business world, but he continues to serve in a number of defense-related activities, most recently as a member of the Blue Ribbon Commission reporting to Congress on ballistic missile threats to the United States. It's now my pleasure to present our moderator, General Lee Butler.
Good morning. I have a little interstate business to clear up before we get into this morning's program. First of all, let me say that as a card carrying fan of Cornhusker football, it's a damn good thing you asked me to come down here before football season starts. The Big 12 idea is about the dumbest deal anybody ever got caught up in. Nobody told us we would have to play real football teams for a change. Second, I have an introduction to make. Now, I know the rules, I lived in Texas. I know that a Nebraskan cannot come here without a passport. So I brought my own. I brought a card carrying Texan. Her name is Dorene Sue Nunley Butler, from San Antonio, Texas.
I saved Dorene from a life of fame and fortune as a dancer thirty-six and a half years ago, and her reward for that was to hang curtains in twenty-eight different homes in our thirty-three years in the Air Force. What a guy! I suppose that you all understand by now that this is, in fact, a homecoming for Dorene and for me. Abilene is, in fact, our official second hometown, and we are proud to be back among friends and kin. Dorene is related to about half the population of West Texas. Her favorite uncle and aunt are coming down tomorrow from Lubbock to be with us, and we appreciate the fact that you all would welcome them here as well.
I must also say that I was very intrigued when Bill called with the invitation to moderate the annual meeting of Philosophical Society of Texas. I checked with a historian over in Lincoln to see if there was a Nebraska Philosophical Society. He said, "Well, not exactly. The closest thing we have is Tom Osborne's post-game call-in program." And, unfortunately, we don't do that anymore. With our record this year, we do need to be philosophical, but mostly we are hurt.
But I was equally intrigued by the subject that you all have chosen for this year's meeting. National security is a subject that has been near and dear to my heart for over forty years. As a life-long strategist, as a leader of combat forces, a pilot, and a student, national military strategy and planning and operations were my stock-in-trade for four decades. In fact, in the latter stages of my career, I was directly responsible for United States national military strategy, the organization of our Armed Forces around the world, our global alliance structure, and in one of the most fascinating responsibilities I've ever held, opening up military-to-military relations with the former Warsaw Pact countries and the Soviet Union. But more to the point of our meeting today, I held those particular responsibilities in the period from 1988 to 1991, just as the Cold War was ending and the strategic context of United States national security for the preceding forty years was turned upside down. So what I would like to do, to set the stage for our speakers this morning, is to spend the next few minutes talking about strategic context, the historical and contemporary forces that I see moving across the national security landscape, and their implications for the security of the United States as a nation and for our unique role in the international arena.
I'll begin with what I call one of life's defining moments, 1 October 1989. That's the day when Colin Powell became the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Among the many things he did that morning, he picked up the phone and called Lee Butler, his three-star Director of Strategic Plans and Policy. He said, "Lee, morning, this is Colin." Now, I'm quick. I knew right away that my answer was, "Yes, sir." He said, "You have a minute?" I just happened to have a minute. He said, "Why don't you come on down, let's chat for a few seconds?" I went down to his office, this vast expanse of mahogany, and all I could see was stars glittering in front of my eyes. "Lee," he said, "you and I are going to be doing a lot of work together over the next few years. I think we ought to get to some initial understandings up front." He said, "Uh, I've only got about five minutes, but why don't you give me your world view?" Well, fortunately, the University of Texas had been running a special on world views just that month, and I had picked one up. Well, as my career flashed in front of my eyes, one of the things I remembered someone had told me about Colin Powell is that he liked to talk in sound bites. So, here was my thirty-second reply to him. I said, "Well, Mr. Chairman, I see it this way. The Soviet Union is fibrillating, Eastern Europe is liberating, Western Europe is integrating, the Far East is oscillating, the Mid-East is disintegrating, and the rest of the world is percolating. The long and short of that is we're about to lose our best enemy, the defense budget is gonna fall off a cliff, and your life is gonna be a living hell." Then I prepared to meet my maker. Well, let me tell you something about Colin Powell. He never batted an eye. He said, "That's about right. That's the way I see it, also." Then he added, "But that'll happen a lot faster than either you or I suspect. So I want you to go back to your office, and I want you to take what you just said, and I want you to put it in a longer form. Because that'll become the basis for our new national military strategy. It'll take us about eight months to sell that and all the implications that go with it, reshaping the size, composition of our Armed Forces, rethinking our budget." He said, "But that job starts right now. It's in my in-box and now I'm putting it in yours. So come back and see me in two weeks." Two weeks. And I did. I came back with the beginnings of a paper that I called Tides, Trends and Tasks, Security Challenges for the United States in the '90s and Beyond. So what I'd like to do, for just a few minutes this morning, is to sketch that out for you, because, in fact, that is still today the foundation of our national military strategy and the way that our Armed Forces and our security apparatus in general looks at America's role in the world.
I won't talk about tasks, because our speakers today have that job, and I'll be very interested to see how they understand what America's tasks are in the New World Order. But I call it Tides and Trends because, thinking back to my days in Al Hurley's classroom, he said, "Lee, whatever you do, when you're trying to imagine the future, always put it in the context of the past." And so, Al, I went back about 500 years, to the beginnings of the nation-state system. I tried to imagine the forces that were shaping our world over the course of five centuries. Someone once said, maybe it was Walt Rostow, that watershed eras are best seen in retrospect. You have to be cautious about imagining that your age is really so different or so unprecedented. But it struck me that ours was, but it was still being shaped by two tidal forces, an in-rushing, destructive tide that pounds against the seawalls of civilization and threatens, at every moment, to erode our sense of humanity; and an out-flowing tide, which is more calming, but which is still fraught with undercurrents and riptides that can cause us to lose control. I gave very explicit labels to these tides. The incoming tide, I describe thusly: the continuing fractionation of mankind into highly ethnocentric entities, seeking self-determination within self-defined borders. I suppose another way of saying that is the continuing struggle between the learned imperative to advance the norms of civilized behavior, and the instinctive savagery that is so deeply imprinted on our DNA code. The outgoing tide, the calming force, but still fraught with peril, I describe as the compelling quest for a higher order or economic well-being in a world whose physical and human resources were capriciously distributed by history, culture and geography. And another way of saying that is the test of whether technology and inventive genius can elevate every society to a decent station in life, or whether grasping, unbridled competition will simply relegate much of the world's population to unrelenting poverty.
That was my analysis. And now, eight years later, I have the sense that those are still the compelling forces acting in our world and in our lives, and shaping our national security. Within those tides, I could see crosscurrents, riptides that I call the contemporary trends, the immediate problems posed by the historical forces, their contemporary manifestation, if you will. And I imagine those to be the following six.
First and foremost, the astounding advent of a second Russian Revolution in this century. It is, to my way of thinking, the defining event of our age. It was wholly unanticipated. The spontaneous collapse of the Soviet Empire has left the United States without a defining sense of national purpose. We, in fact, lost our best enemy. It leaves Europe with a daunting security dilemma and Russia on the verge of chaos.
The second eventuality was the astonishing achievement of German unification, which itself created extraordinary opportunities for European growth and cooperation, even as it rekindled long-held fears of a dominant political and economic power unable to contain its ambitions.
Third, the prospects for a Twenty-first Century Concert of Europe, but one that works this time, the creation of an economic superpower on a scale to rival the United States, and increasingly restive under the cloak of our political and military leadership.
Fourth, the intensification of intractable conflicts between mortal enemies, now fueled by the reality or the near-term prospect of resort to weapons of mass destruction.
Fifth, catastrophic failures in the human condition in the Third World, where hundreds of millions of people are living in misery to the end of short and brutish lives. Victims of starvation, drugs, debt, poverty and disease, and hostage to the modern Horsemen of the Apocalypse: religious fundamentalism, murderous tribalism, ethnocentrism, and xenophobic nationalism.
And finally, the looming rise of new hegemonic powers, the unholy marriage of regional ambitions, teeming populations, unscrupulous leaders and modern arsenals of high tech weapons.
These historic forces in their current manifestation impose an enormous burden on the United States not only in terms of our security, but also in its larger dimension of concern for the welfare of our fellow travelers on Spaceship Earth. Only we have, or are perceived to have, the political, economic and military strength, and the sense of moral obligation to manage the stunning array of tasks and challenges that emerge from this new global circumstance, which is motivated by the enduring tides of history.
Your speakers this morning have the challenge of addressing how these trends translate into contemporary threats to our vital national interests. But what I would leave you with is to simply remember that neither our survival nor our quality of life is solely a function of our narrow self-interest. Ultimately, they will be governed by our broader sense of humanity, our innate goodness as a people and, above all, our capacity to lead with vision and with courage. Thank you all for the honor of presiding over your session this morning. I look forward with great anticipation to the rest of the program.
About two years ago, President Clinton defined terrorism as the single most important national security threat as we move into the next century, a view that was endorsed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. While some may disagree that terrorism is the most important threat, few would disagree that it certainly is one of the most important national security threats. On that the Administration, the attentive public, and the general public agree.
Terrorism complicates a national security paradigm that was designed primarily to deal with nation-states. With terrorism we confront an increasingly complex and often shadowy subject matter where you have non-state actors, tribal conflicts, civil wars, and the like. What I would like to do this morning is share how we attempt to impose some intellectual order on the complicated issue of terrorism and leave the details and the nuances for your questions later on.
It seems to me that the first task is to define terrorism. Very often the terms "revolutionary warfare," "insurgency," "terrorism," "guerrilla warfare," and so on are used interchangeably. This is a mistake since they are different phenomena. I can tell you that for the last twenty-five years, academics and people in the policy arena have debated the definitional issue and have not come up with a consensus. But there is a near consensus. And I will rely on the near consensus because it is consistent with what I generally would conceive terrorism to be, namely: the threat or use of physical coercion against non-combatants, especially civilians, to create fear in order to achieve political objectives. I think this captures most of what most analysts believe is the essence of terrorism.
Terrorism is violent behavior that is directed at innocent victims. All of us are potential victims of terrorism. Whatever the specific acts might be, in most cases the victims have no direct connection to the issues at hand. Basically, they are irrelevant since terrorists are trying to influence an audience (a government, the public, the media, etc.) situated somewhere else to do something, maybe to do many things. Since those things vary from case to case, we must guard against the tendency to over-generalize.
When we look at terrorism, in terms of the definition I have suggested, the distinguished chairman of this conference, General Lee Butler, could be considered a terrorist. As head of the Strategic Air Command, he was prepared to execute orders that under certain options would have involved nuclear attacks on urban areas that would have inflicted incalculable civilian casualties. But short of executing such a command, General Butler was threatening to do so, the major hope being that the threat to use force of this magnitude would deter the Soviet Union from doing so. We need only recall that this situation was not only referred to as mutual assured destruction. It was also characterized as the "balance of terror." Fear, of course, was central to all of this.
Historically speaking, the bombings at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Dresden, and so on were acts of terrorism. Why do I say that? It sounds provocative. It is because Americans, like most people, have a tendency to deny that they have engaged in or supported acts of terrorism. No one wants to be called a terrorist. Yasir Arafat doesn't want to be called a terrorist. Indeed he has always maintained he is a freedom fighter, not a terrorist! We respond by saying to the Arafats of this world that their notion that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter is nonsense in that it is a transparent attempt to confuse ends (freedom) and means (terrorism).
Whether it is Arafat or us, the real issue is whether or not actions meet the definitional criteria. That's crucial. Once we have crossed that threshold and been intellectually honest with ourselves by admitting that in some cases we have engaged in acts of terrorism or the people we have supported have done so, we can then ask another range of questions.
The first might be whether an act of terrorism is moral, immoral, or amoral. Here you could certainly make the case that if Lee Butler had to execute the single integrated operational plan under certain conditions, it might be a moral act. Or, that the bombings in World War II were morally justifiable. Other questions would inquire whether terrorist acts were selective or indiscriminate, criminal or non-criminal, legal or illegal, rational or irrational, and so on. In effect, these are all adjectives that we can use to qualify the term "terrorism" and provide some context for better understanding it. And it is here that those who say they are freedom fighters can enter the argument. But first, they have to acknowledge if they knowingly attacked noncombatants or civilians. Then, if they did, they can proceed to make the case that that it was or is justifiable.
Once we agree on what we mean by terrorism and suggest some qualifiers, we must identify its various agents (in law enforcement lexicon, the perpetrators). At this point I have taken the liberty to go beyond what's stated on your program, because I think it's too narrow to look only at state-sponsored terrorism. We need to look at the whole picture, if we are to have a better and more comprehensive understanding of terrorism in the transmillennial age. Accordingly, with your permission, I would like to sketch out the remaining attributes of a holistic approach to the issue of terrorism.
First of all, individuals can do it-for example, the Yigal Amers and Theodore Kaczinskis of this world, the anti-abortion bombers and the single-issue people. That's important to bear in mind because, as we have seen, these "lone wolves" can be extremely deadly. Second and more important, we have states that use terrorism against their own people, usually to maintain control and quell dissent. There is a long legacy here. We see it clearly in ancient African kingdoms about which E. V. Walter has written. We have seen it in our times with Saddam Hussein and his so-called Republic of Fear. He has institutionalized terror against civilians, often inflicting physical harm on those that are known to be innocent (victims) in order to influence those who might oppose his regime (the real audience or target). So this is an age-old story. The terror that the Iraqi regime carries out against its citizens is very direct in that it is done by various security agencies. State terrorism can, however be indirect. Death squads in El Salvador during the 1980s come immediately to mind. And let's face it, it wasn't too long ago that the United States nodded and looked the other way while the feared ORDEN (Democratic Nationalist Organization) ran amok in El Salvador. Yes, the United States was an accomplice to terrorism despite the courageous protests at the time by Ambassador Robert H. White. States also are agents of terror against other states, directly or indirectly. In a notable example of direct culpability the Syrians sent an Air Force intelligence officer to plan and direct the destruction of an El Al airliner in mid-air, a scheme that fortunately was detected beforehand. The alleged involvement of Libyan agents in the Lockerbie bombing is another case in point.
The indirect use of terrorism by states relies on third parties. If, for example, you are the Syrians and you wish to achieve various objectives vis-à-vis the Turks, including getting Ankara to agree on an explicit plan to share the waters of the Euphrates River, you may wish to support terrorist attacks in Turkey by third parties like PKK secessionists or Abu Nidal. Once the Turks capitulate, you can end such support. Next we have the big area of non-state actors, and it is here that the tribal warfare that was discussed before by Dr. Marks comes into play. Non-state actors are of major concern to us. There are the old, well-organized, insurgent organizations across the world that engage in all sorts of terrorism. And then there are the trans-national groups and coalitions, the Al-Qaida organization of Osama bin Laden being illustrative. Essentially, they find people of like mind-in some cases from different types of groups-and bring them together in an ad hoc coalition for a specific act, like the World Trade Center bombing. Needless to say, this is very difficult to anticipate and deal with. On a somewhat different tack, as we look to the future, we have to ask ourselves, might there come a time when criminal organizations that have used terrorism for their own purposes, such as the Mafia, enter the political arena and use terrorism? I've talked to people who deal with gangs in California, some of which have de facto no-go areas that police are reluctant to enter. Thus far, these groups have not engaged in political terrorism. But there might come a day, if the social and economic disparities worsen, especially with respect to the Hispanic population, that some people in the criminal enterprise will take on a political coloration. Speaking in the name of relatively deprived people in the barrio, they may very well carry out acts of terrorism in pursuit of some newly defined political agenda. Experts who have spent considerable time with gangs believe this is an entirely plausible scenario.
Once we identify who it is that are engaging in terrorism, we must turn to a consideration of what causes them to do so. I will comment briefly on this and, if you like, provide more detail in the question and answer period. For now, I would simply emphasize psychological and contextual explanations. Gerald Post of George Washington University will tell you some individuals are predisposed to acts of violence because of inner drives, needs, and frustrations, regardless of structural or contextual factors. These are people that he says have split personalities-the good and the bad. They retain the good for themselves and project (or externalize) the bad onto other people. The problem here, as you no doubt suspect, is that such generalizations are hard to sustain because we have reliable data on only a handful of groups. We don't have enough information to be even marginally confident. Having said that, I acknowledge that where information is available psychological explanations can contribute to our understanding of the causes of terrorism.
A more productive line of inquiry, in my opinion, is to identify and discuss the contextual causes of terrorism. Among the possible causes here are acrimonious societal divisions along religious, racial, ethnic, or tribal lines. Sometimes class conflicts are the underlying genesis of terrorism. Particularly bad are situations where class distinctions are superimposed on ethnic, tribal, and/or religious differences as in, say, Sudan, Turkish Kurdistan, or Northern Ireland. And then there is what I would call the dysfunctional impact of social change. What I have in mind here are the psychological dislocations generated by growing populations and extensive migration from rural areas to impersonal cities that can't provide services for those populations. Especially troubling are changes in values and institutional identifications and behavior that all too frequently affect individuals caught up in this process, particularly young people who in many places in the Third World make up over 70 percent of the population.
Many sacrifice old traditions and religious values on the altar of modernity, only to find their hopes destroyed by the existential realities of poverty and unemployment. For example, in the Middle East some Muslims may ignore prayer while others compromise the fast during Ramadan because such duties are deemed incompatible with new life styles or economic necessity. And then, one day they wake up and begin to take stock of what they've given up for very little in return. Needless to say, when large numbers of people begin to feel this way, it can be very destabilizing. Psychologists and the sociologists have little trouble finding such disillusioned people on the streets of Algiers, Cairo, and other cities. They are notably present in both non-violent and militant Islamic revivalist groups.
Economic causes of terrorism are also not hard to find, especially class and group relative deprivation. Potentially very troubling are periods where a rise in prosperity is followed by a sharp decline. Finally, we should note that in some cases political factors like lack of representation, failure to allow desired participation, and downright lack of responsiveness to legitimate grievances may be contributing causes of terrorism.
Having inquired about the causes of terrorism, we can then take up the question of ultimate terrorist political goals. There is a wide variation here. Anarchists wish to destroy organized political authority while secessionists-like the very brutal Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, Basque Homeland and Liberty, and the IRA-want to create their own nation-states or merge with another one. Egalitarians like the Shining Path in Peru or the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia envisage a new social and political order that actualizes the value of equality. By contrast, traditionalists wish to recreate a golden age of the past in which a privileged few ruled an inert mass in the name of religious or philosophical values. Although on opposite sides of the political spectrum, both egalitarians and traditionalists thrive on the kinds of social and economic dislocations I mentioned earlier.
While traditionalists are prevalent today, owing largely to the Islamic revival, we cannon rule out some kind of Marxist resurgence, if the misery that Lee Butler so rightfully called attention to endures and intensifies. Whether in the Sierra Madre in Mexico or somewhere else, the message will no doubt be that the Soviet and Chinese versions of Marxism were ill-conceived and hypocritical. The new Marxism, by contrast, will be intellectually compelling and morally consistent. Was this not the message of the self-styled "fourth sword of Marxism," Abimael Guzman of the Shining Path? And did it not resonate effectively for a period of time? The questions are: who will be the new Guzmans and what harm can they cause?
But our catalog of ultimate aims is not complete. We must also note the pluralist organizations like the African National Congress, which, according to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, carried out attacks on civilians in the name of establishing a democratic order as we know it. These and historical antecedents like the People's Will in Russia have sometimes been called "liberals with bombs."
Finally, we need to mention preservationists and reformists. The former, like the Afrikaner Resistance Movement during the last phase of the apartheid system and militant Protestants in Northern Ireland in the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), have sought to maintain the sociopolitical order as it is. As the British found out, the UVF and associated groups were, at times, more deadly than the secessionists of the IRA! Reformists, by contrast, are not concerned with the basic values and institutions that comprise the political system. They simply want a fair distribution of social, economic, and political benefits. The Kurds in Iran exemplify this.
But what about the future? Are there new groups and goals that merit our attention? The answer is yes. Two are of concern. The first, whom we might call apocalyptic utopians, envisages an ideal human order which will emerge out of the ashes of a violent catastrophe that they will help bring about. Aum Shinriyko is illustrative here. Despite the vague and muddled thinking of its members ("junk ideas" in the words of one Japanese theologian), they can, as the Tokyo sarin gas attack showed, be very dangerous. The second group would be the nihilistic aggrandizers who are devoid of ideas and simply want power and material resources. The incredibly savage terrorists in Sierra Leone, whose favorite tactic is to render people economically useless by hacking off their arms and/or legs, come to mind in this regard.
The general point of all this is that since the ultimate goals of terrorists vary enormously, it is crucial that we take the time to ascertain just what it is that they are seeking. Then we can turn to the short-term objectives of terrorist acts, which also vary greatly and come in different combinations. In the interests of time, I will simply take note of some of them: namely, gaining publicity, exacting ransom payments (a favorite in Colombia), obtaining the release of prisoners, undermining rival groups, enhancing the stature of one's own group, maintaining an organization that is close to extinction, provoking government repression (a preference of Basque Homeland and Liberty), gaining entry to a peace process, destroying a peace process, and revenge. The last deserves a few comments.
Revenge in and of itself may be the aim of a terrorist action, something that an American audience often finds hard to believe. Our tendency is to look for some clearly stated objective that makes an act somewhat rational. When no group acknowledges responsibility or articulates an aim we are puzzled. What our puzzlement overlooks is the fact that some individuals and groups come from cultures in which revenge is highly valued. In fact, they have terms for it, such as tar in Upper Egypt or badal in Afghanistan. A concrete example of such an act would be the infamous bombings of the Israeli embassy and Argentine-Jewish society buildings in Argentina. Hezbollah's guilt is generally accepted yet it never took credit. Why? The answer is that both acts can easily be seen as the long-promised retribution for an Israeli air attack that killed the Secretary General of Hezbollah and members of his entourage. It was, at least in large part, an act of revenge that the group felt duty-bound to carry out.
Once we have identified the ultimate and short-term goals of terrorists, we need to ask a question about the strategy of the people involved, whomever they might be-individuals, states, or insurgent organizations. Strategy is the integrated use of political, economic, informational, and violent instruments of power to achieve goals. It is, if you will, the plan or way one uses resources to achieve aims. The key questions here are: do the terrorists have a strategy? If so, what is it and how effective are they when it comes to implementing it? In general, we can say that some terrorists have no strategy and this is a fatal flaw. Others have a strategy but it is diffuse, fragmented, and poorly thought out. In yet other cases, the strategy is explicit and clearly articulated. Four grand strategies have been popular in the twentieth century: the conspiratorial; the protracted popular war, which is the Maoist approach; the military focus, which is essentially a Cuban approach (that's where it was codified); and the urban warfare scheme. These are ones you will find emulated to greater or lesser degree in many places across the world.
As we look to the future and press the boundaries of our intellectual horizons a little bit, we have to inquire whether there might be a new strategy that is in its embryonic stage. What I have in mind here is a strategy that is simple in design but potentially very deadly. It might be called "catastrophic extortion. "It would rely primarily on the use of so-called weapons of mass destruction, which we'll come to in a moment. The notion is to threaten their use to achieve specific aims and if there is no response to carry out a terrible act and threaten to do it again.
Putting the question of strategy aside, let us quickly touch on the variety of weapons the terrorists use. Weapons and bombs remain, and will probably continue to be, the weapons of choice since they are easily constructed and available. But, as we have foreshadowed in previous comments, there are new, more ominous possibilities as we look to the future. I am, of course, referring to chemical, biological, radiological, and cyber weapons. Perhaps anticipating this, one of the leaders of Hamas commented that his movement had started with knives, moved to guns, and then on to bombs. Now, he said, it was ready to turn to new things. For us, and most especially for the Israelis, the question is what are the new things? Sarin gas? Anthrax powder? As former Soviet biological expert Ken Alibeck has pointed out in lectures and his recent book, the possibilities here are numerous and shocking. It may or may not be true that the probabilities of their use in the future will be low. Even if they are low, we must still be vigilant since the costs may be high. By vigilant, I do not mean panicking the general public. I do mean committing more resources to intelligence and to preparing and training the first responders who will have to initially deal with the consequences.
Permit me to say something about the use of chemical, biological, radiological, or cyber weapons for selective rather than mass destruction, since that option may be more likely in that it minimizes the possibility of fratricide. So far, most of the discussion of these weapons has assumed mass destruction, the implication being that the casualties will be in the hundreds of thousands. I would suggest to you that there is an equally horrifying scenario, and that is using them in a more sophisticated way to create fear without killing en masse. Rather than target the citizens of Abilene indiscriminately, why not target only the people in this hall with say, a biological or chemical agent sometime today? Although there may be only a few hundred victims, imagine how quickly fear will intensify and spread in this city and beyond. In this scenario, you really don't have to inflict hundreds of thousands of casualties like Ramsi Yousef said he wanted to do if he had chemical weapons at the World Trade Center. The formula is to kill or injure a select group with an insidious weapon that invokes unusual fear. This is what I would be most concerned about.
Hypothetically speaking, if I were to ask a member of the Islamic Jihad Movement for Palestine or Hamas how he would go about it if he thought in these terms, he might say, "I'll go to a primarily Jewish shopping center at the end of Dizengoff Street in Tel Aviv. I'll go to the shopping center, and place a chemical or biological device there. There will be few, if any, Arab casualties but many Jewish ones. Enough Jewish ones to spread panic and fear."
There is a related and interesting point when you look at the aggregate data; namely, that the groups that are the most threatening in the future are not the old-line egalitarian Maoist-type groups that we were concerned about in the Cold War. The most deadly groups now-and probably in the future-are and will be religious and national separatist groups. Think about that. In the name of the nation, but even more to the point in the name of God, one could justify killing or maiming hundreds of thousands of people. When you read and analyze what justifications they write or say, and take note of the way they usually dehumanize and demonize their adversaries, it is not hard to understand why they consider their behavior to be perfectly moral. And they have shown an inclination to do these things.
So what then, just by way of summary, should be our general guidelines for dealing with the problem of terrorism? First, it is imperative to recognize the centrality of intelligence. We need to know about impending incidents beforehand. If we do not and a major incident goes down, the postmortems will point back and say we should have had better intelligence, or we had it and didn't share it. Technical intelligence is very important in this regard, but human intelligence is probably more important.
The next guideline I would stress is reliance on law enforcement and the judicial system. When it comes to law enforcement agencies and the intelligence organizations they must cooperate with, there can be no substitute for rock-solid coordination. The days of petty interagency bickering and distrust must give way in the face of the seriousness of the threat. Happily, there is a growing acknowledgement of this. There are a number of steps that have been taken to improve the situation, and I want to make sure that due credit is given to those who have done those things, especially in the counterterrorism centers of the FBI and CIA. However, when I go and talk to people at the working level and ask if they are satisfied with the level of cooperation and coordination on this issue and the notion that bureaucratic barriers have been overcome, without exception they have answered in the negative and suggested that there is a long way to go to try to change the bureaucratic culture, so that intelligence and law enforcement organizations-NSA, DIA, CIA, FBI, etc.-make the best use of the information a their disposal.
A third guideline is to ensure that whatever laws and policies we craft don't undermine basic democratic values and principles. There's always an impulse cut corners to nab terrorists, because they do such brutal, terrible things. We cannot do that. To draw and slightly paraphrase an analogy based on a well-known statement from Vietnam, you can't destroy the village (in this case democratic values and liberties) in order to save it. It makes no sense.
Next, we get into long-term guidelines. Lee Butler talks about increased misery. The misery index in the Third World going up. It'll continue on into the next century, and no one thinks it can be fixed overnight. This is not a prescription for doing nothing. There are many socio-economic policies you may devise and implement in order to alleviate suffering in places where you have vital or major national interests. Hopefully, whatever you do will be successful in reducing the probabilities of terrorism and political violence. But, realism and experience caution us that we may not be very successful here. In the meantime, we have to deal with immediate threats.
As for the military response to terrorism, its role has to be carefully defined. Although I think dealing with terrorism is a law enforcement and intelligence problem, this does not mean the military has no role. To the contrary, in certain cases, it may be very important. A question I have here is this: have we thought through deterrents with regard to various kinds of terrorism, like state sponsored terrorism? How do you deter different kinds of terrorists? For instance, can you use the military to try to deter Osama bin Laden, and, if so, how? Moreover, if terrorism has commenced, how can the military be used to end it? And, if the consequences of given terrorist acts are severe, what is the military role in coping with them?
Compelling its termination, of course. Managing its effect. So-called consequence management. And lots of people getting involved in that nowadays. We can come back to it.
Finally, we must note the importance of legislative and institutional reforms in the twenty-first century. This is a very important point. In Washington we have placed greater emphasis on what is called "jointness," by which we mean getting the military services to work together. Thanks to the leadership and persistence of Congressman Ike Skelton of Missouri, we have made enormous strides in this regard. But this is not enough, especially when it comes to terrorism. And here again, Congressman Skelton leads the way when he insists on "jointness plus." If we expect our armed services to work closely together to cope with military problems, why would we not expect the agencies on all levels of government that deal with terrorism to do the same? One arena for addressing this problem is in the vital education provided to future government leaders in elite senior schools like the National War College. In practical terms, it would mean having students from various law enforcement and intelligence agencies adequately represented in their student bodies.
To conclude, terrorism is and will continue to be a major problem for all of us. It is a complex challenge that requires a tough, sophisticated, and well-informed response that puts a premium on a precise understanding of the long-term goals, short-term objectives, and strategies, tactics, and weapons of terrorists. Within this context, the most horrific specter is quite clearly the use of chemical, biological, and radiological weapons. I think it would take a good deal of audacity to say that the current technical and political obstacles to their use will not be overcome. Lest we be too dismissive, we should recall the skepticism about things like the e-mail or the Internet. Indeed, it was not too long ago that some said they were impossible. Can we afford to express the same disbelief about the technical impediments to nuclear, chemical, and biological terrorism and then wake up one day to find out we were wrong? I leave the answer to you.
More than thirty years ago, the Canadian journalist, Marshall McLuhan predicted that the new means of rapid communications and rapid transportation would turn the world into what he called the "global village." From our viewpoint today, it is clear that his prophecy was accurate. What he foresaw has happened, and with the additional technology of computer networks, international business and other relations have become so tightly intertwined that there really exists today a "global village." While this is true, it is also true that only a fraction of the world's people benefit from the existence of the "global village." Only those who can afford the technology, the television sets, the personal computers, and the airline fares actually experience it. While these things are all relatively cheap, there are still a great many people in the world who do not have access to the technology. Therefore, they feel that they do not belong to the "global village." Those who exploit these feelings have used the same technologies that make the "global village" possible to sponsor terrorism and social conflict all over the world. In short, while McLuhan's prediction of the benign "global village" has come true, he did not foresee the darker consequences that have also accompanied the application of the technology that he was probably the first to truly understand. (INSERT MARSHALL McLUHAN'S SLIDE)
The existence of the "global village" has, without doubt, had a unifying effect on the human race, or at least that part of it that populates this new entity in cyberspace. At the same time, however, another trend has developed which has resulted in much suffering and which seems to be caused by a reversion to what can only be called "tribal warfare" in many areas of the world. This trend is almost diametrically opposed to the development of the "global village" in that it tends to fragment the world rather than unify it. Paradoxically then, we have two movements that seem to be in opposition, occurring simultaneously around the world. If the human rape is, indeed, to reap the benefits of the "global village", then it must also learn how to control the "tribal warfare" which afflicts us.
The most serious decision that any president of the United States is called upon to make is to put U.S. military forces in "harm's way." This paper is an attempt to develop some guidelines that might be useful in reaching the conclusion that military intervention is the correct course of action in some of the many conflicts-I have called them "tribal wars" for reasons that I will explain shortly-that are now in progress around the world. (INSERT GLOBAL VILLAGE; HARM'S WAY SLIDES)
II. Different Kinds of Warfare
What is meant by a "tribal war"? It is important to try and distinguish between four different types of wars: wars between nations, civil wars, guerrilla wars, and tribal wars. Such distinctions may not be very clear, and there will be considerable overlap in the definitions. Nevertheless, the attempt to draw such distinctions is important because the responses-political, economic, and military that the United States and other nations may be called upon to make-depend upon the clarity of the objectives and the precision of our thinking. (INSERT DIFFERENT KINDS OF WARFARE SLIDE) Here are some distinctions that might be useful:
1. Wars Between Nations
These are defined as conventional conflicts between nation states with established governments that are fought using regular military forces. The governments can usually control the situation. They can make alliances with other nation states that may or may not share common ethnic or religious heritages. Usually, they can make armistices and also stop wars when that is deemed to be in their respective interests. An example of an incident between two nations was the border clash between Peru and Ecuador in 1995. The dispute over some territory near the headwaters of the Amazon did lead to a short conflict, which was then suspended when the two countries declared an armistice. In short, both governments were in control and could stop the conflict when policy dictated. A more recent (1998) example is the skirmish in Kashmir between India and Pakistan. Since the partition of British India in 1947, the province of Kashmir has been disputed territory. Periodically, there have been armed conflicts in Kashmir between the two successor nations, India and Pakistan. These conflicts have always been tightly controlled by the two governments and have been carried out by the regular military forces of each nation. Wars between nations can be large or small, and the great world wars of this century were, of course, the most destructive examples of this kind of conflict. (INSERT WAR BETWEEN NATIONS SLIDE)
2. Civil Wars
These can be defined as armed struggles between people of the same background for control of the government of a nation. Civil wars are often rebellions or revolutions against existing regimes by a regional or a political group within the same nation, and they are fought using regular military organizations. An example of a straightforward civil war was the conflict in Spain from 1937 to 1939 in which regular armed forces were used on both sides. The brutal conflict between the Khmer Rouge and the constituted government in Cambodia during the 1970s and early 1980s is another more recent case in point. Very often in civil wars, each side makes alliances with other nations around the world that sympathize with their respective causes. This was, of course, the case in both Spain and Cambodia. (INSERT CIVIL WAR SLIDE)
3. Guerrilla Wars
Guerrilla wars are closely related to civil wars, and the distinction made here is mostly one of means. In the case of a guerrilla war, the rebels are, again, usually of the same ethnic and religious background as the people in power, but they do not use regular military means to conduct the conflict. In contrast to a civil war where the two sides may occupy well defined regions of the nation, in a guerrilla war, there is not the same tendency to be "territorial." Good examples of guerrilla wars were the conflict between the Sandinistas and the government in Nicaragua; Fidel Castro's conquest of Cuba in 1959; and the "dirty war" in Argentina during the decade of the 1970s. Guerrilla wars may have similar political objectives to the "civil wars" defined earlier, but they differ in the military tactics used. (INSERT GUERRILLA WAR SLIDE)
4. Tribal Wars
A "tribal war' is a war within a nation or a group of nations based on ethnic, cultural, religious, or racial differences. Recent examples of these are the conflicts in Northern Ireland, Rwanda, Kurdistan, the Caucasus region of the former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia, and possibly Mexico. The bloody war between Iraq and Iran fought during the 1980s, is an example of a "tribal war" that is also a "war between nations." In this case it was Arab and Sunni Moslem Iraq against non-Arab and Shiite Moslem Iran. Note that the term "tribe" has been applied broadly here to identify any group having clearly distinct religious, ethnic, racial, or cultural characteristics. A good case can be made that the situation that developed in Los Angeles some years ago, following the acquittal of the police officers responsible for the beating of Rodney King, was also really a "tribal war" between the different racial factions living in that city. "Tribal wars" may be conducted by "regular" military forces under the usual discipline; as is, for example, the case in the former Yugoslavia, or by guerrillas or street mobs that are not controlled by anyone. Many "tribal wars" are particularly bitter such as, the conflict in the Middle East between the Arabs and the Israelis, which could also be called a "war between nations", and the conflict between different religious groups among the Moslems and the ethnic Arabs. In these cases, the differences that cause the conflict are, essentially, irreconcilable and that, in turn leads to the extremely vicious nature of these conflicts. It is, of course, this point that makes the understanding of "tribal" conflicts particularly important. (INSERT TRIBAL WAR SLIDE)
III. Tribal Warfare
It is true that the world has been afflicted with "tribal warfare" since the beginning of recorded history, and somehow, mankind has both survived and prospered. What is new and what makes tribal wars particularly dangerous, aside from their generally vicious and intransigent nature, is the spread of high technology weapons, including nuclear weapons, and other weapons of mass destruction around the world. A century ago, it was possible for the world at large to ignore most tribal conflicts. Many were localized in regions of the world that were, so to speak, off the beaten track as far as the "mainstream" of civilization was concerned. This is no longer true, and it is for this reason that means must be sought to deal with tribal wars wherever they occur. The very same technologies that made the "global village" possible also make tribal wars more dangerous. The perceived increase in the incidents of tribal warfare recently is certainly a consequence of better communications with organization such as CNN now distributing "instant news" on a worldwide scale. Although data are scanty, there may really be more tribal wars today than there have been in the past, and that this may actually be a consequence of the globalization of much of the world's culture and economy. People who feel excluded from this culture and the benefits of the global economy may look inward toward their "tribal" groups for identification and self-fulfillment. In an increasingly homogenous cultural and economic world, this may be the psychological response of many people who feel that they not part of this new world.
Tribal wars, also because of modern means of travel, may spread around the world, primarily through acts of terrorism. Such acts are extremely difficult to predict, and measures to deal with them, unfortunately, may often infringe upon the freedoms enjoyed by people not involved in the tribal conflict. The attack on the World Trade Center in New York in 1993 was a "spill over" of tribal wars being conducted in the Middle East in which the United States has occasionally intervened.
Another feature of tribal wars is that they may be very difficult to stop. Since the wars are based on religious, racial, ethnic, or cultural differences, these cannot be easily changed, and therefore, the conflicts cannot be easily ended. It is important here to distinguish between the various factors that might motivate "tribes" in such wars. If the purpose of the war is extermination of the other "tribe" (ethnic cleansing) in a certain region, then the war is probably impossible to stop. This is the case in Palestine and also probably the former Yugoslavia. On the other hand, if the objective of the "tribe" is to be included in the general society, then an accommodation may be possible. An argument can be made that this is the situation in the Mexican province of Chiapas. If one takes the Zapatistas at their word, then what they want is inclusion in the larger Mexican society. Thus reaching an accommodation in this case may be easier than in those tribal wars in which one side or the other wants to fight to the bitter end. In the latter instances, "containment" should be the objective. It is the containment of such "bitter end" tribal conflicts that becomes extremely important, especially in view of the availability of extremely destructive, high technology weapons.
The central thesis of this paper is that tribal wars of the kind described are the most important single threat to world peace. Therefore, developing the diplomatic and military means for dealing with such situations becomes critical if, indeed, we are to build the "global village" that Marshall McLuhan foresaw. (INSERT FEATURES OF TRIBAL WARFARE SLIDE)
IV. Intervention in Tribal Wars
There are, essentially, three reasons why the world community might wish to develop means for intervening in tribal wars. The first is the necessity for a stable environment to maintain the global village. Tribal wars can often spread and become a larger regional or worldwide conflict. The second is to control the spread of biological, nuclear, and chemical weapons. If one side or another acquired nuclear weapons, they could create destruction that would be unacceptable. The third reason is for humanitarian intervention to relieve the suffering in tribal wars. In 1992, the U.S. became involved in Somalia to mitigate the effects of famine. In 1995, the U.S. intervened in the former Yugoslavia to put a stop to ethnic cleansing and prevent this conflict from spreading to neighboring regions.
In the previous paragraph, I have listed reasons why the "world community" might want to intervene in a tribal war. There are also cases in which the President of the United States might want to make the decision to intervene unilaterally when vital national interests of the United States are threatened.
The most benign kind of intervention in a tribal conflict is non-military, which typically involve political and economic sanctions. In the case of a political "intervention" this may mean voting with one side or the other in the United Nations or other international bodies. It may also include providing aid to refugees from one side preferentially to the other. Finally, it may simply mean making political speeches that support one side or the other.
Economic "intervention" generally means imposing various sanctions on one side or the other. In a relatively closed society, such as Cuba and Iraq, the effectiveness of economic "intervention" is not clear. However, this action is sometimes effective before taking other steps are taken. In the case of military action, the lowest level of intervention is indirectly by providing weapons and other kinds of military assistance to one side or the other. Conversely, an arms embargo can be imposed on one side or the other. Stationing military advisors in the conflict zone is another choice. Another kind of military intervention is the establishment of a "peace keeping" mission in the territories where the conflict is occurring. This means sending troops to the area. In that connection, it is extremely important to make a distinction between "peace keeping" and "peace making." A "peace keeping" operation is one where both sides have decided to have an armistice, and where keeping the peace is, in fact, a real possibility. In this case, the intervening troops may not have to fight, but must just keep the parties in the conflict apart. The problem of "peace making" is, of course, much more difficult because that involves engaging in direct combat with one or both sides in a tribal war and separating them so that peace is made by force. This normally would require the insertion of a much larger military force.
It is most important, when discussing intervention, to develop and use alliances or cooperative efforts. The United Nations has been most effective in humanitarian efforts such as reducing the famine in Somalia. In a peace keeping role the United Nations is only somewhat effective. Their peace keeping role in Cyprus and in the Middle East was effective; conversely, the United Nations was ineffective in Somalia. In a peace making role the U.N. has not been effective.
NATO and regional alliances can be effective in peace making. Recent demonstrations include the international coalition force's ability to minimize the bloodshed in the former Yugoslavia and the Organization of African Unity's ability to stabilize the turmoil in Liberia. It is critical that the United States develop and participate in cooperative efforts such as these.
Any intervention is likely to be much more effective if it is imposed by a large fraction of the community of nations or by the community of nations at large rather than by the United States alone. This may be difficult to do, but it is most important to develop the appropriate diplomatic means for peaceful intervention that may prevent or stop a conflict before military measures are applied.
Regional alliances and the United Nations also can be used to some effect to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. This is important, and even though the results are not perfect, treaties such as the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) should be maintained. There are some changes warranted in that particular agreement. It is possible that making a distinction between "rogue" nations and those that have legitimate reasons for creating nuclear weapons could and should be made. For example, it is generally conceded that India has good reasons for maintaining nuclear weapons. India has implacable enemies with a long history of conflict that is based on ethnic, religious, and cultural differences. Furthermore, India is a democracy, and it can be argued that the threshold that India would apply to the use of nuclear weapons would be much higher than in the case of "rogue" nations such as North Korea, Libya, Syria, and Iraq. There is a good argument to be made that putting the cards face-up on the table in the nuclear weapons proliferation business would have beneficial effects for the entire world. An approach might be for the five major "admitted" nuclear powers (the United States, Russia, England, France, and China) to invite specific nations, such as India, Pakistan, and others to join the nuclear club. The five major nuclear powers might provide incentives by sharing certain elements of nuclear weapons technology that the other powers are already know to have but that would still be useful. By taking such a step, it might become easier to diplomatically isolate the "rogue" nations with sanctions that do not have substantial "leaks." Also, it might become easier to control the flow of weapons grade nuclear materials around the world. It is not clear whether this suggestion can be implemented given the current situation that we face. On the other hand, it is extremely important to propose creative ideas at this point to prevent catastrophes that are waiting to happen in future tribal wars. (INSERT INTERVENTION IN TRIBAL WARFARE SLIDES)
V. The Role of the United States
For better or for worse, the United States is now the world's only military superpower. It is, therefore, impossible or very difficult for the United States to opt out and to say nothing in the tribal conflicts that are going on around the world. A decision not to intervene in such a conflict is as positive a decision for the world's only superpower as a decision to intervene. The political factors that would lead to nonintervention must, therefore, be as carefully thought out as those that would lead to a decision to intervene. All of this was recently captured by Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, when she said that the United States has become the "indispensable nation" in the post Cold War world.
In addition, there may very well be triggering events that cause intervention by the United States based on domestic policies and other considerations-possibly beyond the control of the political authorities. The ethnic lobbies in United States are very strong, and therefore, they are able to influence foreign policy and the decision to take military action. There is, for example, the "CNN Factor" which, perhaps, caused the intervention in Somalia. There is also the "Randall Robinson Factor"-the fast by Mr. Randall Robinson who is a lobbyist for African Affairs in Washington-that led to American intervention in Haiti. The abuse of U.S. citizens around the world was a factor in the intervention in Panama. Treaties and other commitments would also be a cause for intervention. In all cases, as a general principle, it is better to intervene as a member of a coalition or as part of a United Nations force than to do so unilaterally. However, it should be recognized that the United States cannot, also as a matter of principle, give up the idea that unilateral military intervention in a tribal war might be justified.
Direct military intervention by the United States in a tribal war means the insertion of American combat aircraft, ships, and ultimately, ground forces in the region of the conflict. Direct military intervention may be executed, either unilaterally, as a member of an alliance such as NATO, or as part of a United Nations peacekeeping force. Because of the status of the United States as the only superpower, the responsibility to build these coalitions has devolved on the United States. It is not clear how well prepared the American people are to accept this role at the present time. There has been much rhetoric about not becoming the "world's policeman." This is an open issue that will eventually be settled by the outcome of the debate now going on in this country on this matter. (INSERT FACTORS AFFECTING INTERVENTION SLIDE)
VI. The Criteria for Military Intervention
Given the kinds of military intervention that might be contemplated in a tribal conflict, it is important to develop a calibrated set of criteria that can be used to help in reaching a decision as to whether intervention is desirable in a particular instance. While the United States is very likely to find itself in a leadership position during any discussion of international intervention, the criteria outlined here apply primarily to political decisions that need to be made within the United States when military intervention is contemplated. The following three statements might serve as criteria for military intervention by the United States in a tribal war:
1. When the War Directly Threatens the Vital Interests of the United States This was the case in the Persian Gulf War of 1991 because of the oil resources controlled by Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. Not only were the vital interests of the United States affected, but also the vital interests of our major allies around the world since they all depend on Middle Eastern oil. In the case of the intervention in Panama, the vital interests of the United States were connected to the existence of the Panama Canal. In a number of cases, there are treaty commitments, for instance, that could be regarded as vital national interests where the United States might intervene. Our commitment to the State of Israel might be an example. Any threat to a member of the NATO alliance could also lead to direct intervention in a tribal war by the United States. The direct invasion of one nation by another (the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, for example) could also lead to intervention. Actually, the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein had strong "tribal" elements between Iraq and the family that rules Kuwait. The Iraqis do consider Kuwait to be their "19th Province."
2. When There is a Real Threat That the Tribal War Could Expand Military intervention may be necessary, even if the vital interests of the United States are not directly threatened. If a tribal war threatens to expand to become a world war, then it is in the vital interest, not only of the United States but also of other nations in the world, to take the necessary steps-including military ones-to stop that from occurring. If for example, collective action fails to prevent the spread of a tribal war of this kind, then the United States may have to intervene unilaterally. It is conceivable that the conflict in the former Yugoslavia may fall in this category. The United States has already made a unilateral deployment of a small unit in Macedonia, for example, to help prevent the spread of the conflict to Greece or Turkey. The participants have thus been put on notice that they will have to kill Americans if they expand the conflict into Macedonia. Hopefully, this will raise the threshold of risk for them to the point where they will not expand the conflict.
3. When a "Rogue" Nation Acquires Nuclear or Biological Weapons This is the real problem in places such as North Korea, Iran, or Libya. North Korea is capable of plutonium production. Iran has attempted production of nuclear weapons, and, like Libya, they probably have produced biological weapons too. If such nations develop or acquire nuclear or biological weapons capabilities, then they could interfere decisively in tribal wars around the world. Such threats could clearly become very serious and justify military intervention. Once again, unilateral intervention by the United States may be necessary if collective action fails.
The importance of "triggering events" that might precipitate military intervention, even if the military intervention criteria that are established are not met has already been mentioned. Such triggering events are inherently unexpected and unpredictable and this must be clearly understood. That being the case, they must still be anticipated. Intervention with military force is ultimately a political decision. However, in making such a decision a critical factor is to evaluate the military capabilities of the intervening coalition or nation and the capability of the United States to support the coalition or nation and, if necessary, to intervene unilaterally. The military capability of potential opponents must also be carefully evaluated. All of this is necessary to judge whether military intervention can lead to something useful and decisive. (INSERT CRITERIA FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION SLIDE)
VII. Preparations for Military Intervention
If military action is to be a credible option in either deterring or actually participating in tribal wars, then some preparations must be made. If careful preparations are not part of the agenda, then military intervention is likely to fall. Furthermore, many preparations can and should be made publicly so that the threat of military intervention, either by a coalition of nations, the United Nations, or unilaterally by the United States, is actually credible. In preparing for military actions of this kind, here are some important considerations:
Interventions cannot be undertaken without some political support. Public opinion polls will always be against intervention, at least in the United States. Thus, there is always public opposition, and therefore, an effort must be made to persuade the public that it is wise to intervene. Essentially, a persuasive argument must be made that, in the long term, the cost of not intervening is higher than that incurred by intervention. The most important political consideration that affects military action is to minimize casualties. There are promising technical means that permit us to do that, and this will be considered shortly. Latent opposition to intervention could lead to riots in the streets if casualties are large. Remember that President Clinton decided to withdraw U.S. troops from Somalia after eighteen U.S. soldiers were killed in a fire fight with Somalis. This is a very critical point in developing the political support necessary for intervention in tribal wars.
What kind of weapons are especially suited for intervention in tribal wars? Non-lethal weapons may be very important in this instance. Many people who have participated in such actions say that it is often hard to identify who is the opposition. There is often no visible difference that permits distinguishing a "good guy" from a "bad guy." Non-lethal weapons have the peculiar advantage of not requiring bloodletting. Hopefully, this will help to keep casualty rates down and make the intervention more politically acceptable. There are a number of effective non-lethal weapons in the inventory today, including things such as rubber bullets and non-lethal chemical weapons that have been successfully employed. Weapons delivery systems are also important, and this means advanced missiles of all kinds. If one side in a tribal war can threaten another or even third parties with missiles, then this is an important factor in deciding on intervention. Nuclear weapons are even more important. It is critically important to determine whether one side or another in a tribal war may have access to nuclear weapons. Conventional high-tech weapons can be decisive, as well, which was the case with the "Stinger" missiles that the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan deployed against the Soviet forces.
It is critically important to make certain that a cadre of trained people is available for military actions of this kind. Military attaches around the world are most important in evaluating an early situation. Much more attention needs to be paid to training military attaches who will be assigned to nations likely to be involved in interventions in tribal wars. Specialized forces are also important. Specially trained units may very well have decisive effects in tribal wars, much beyond the actual numerical strength of such units. Specialized forces equipped with special weapons should be part of the military inventory available. The motivation of the troops used in military interventions is particularly critical. How do soldiers react to taking risks in a cause that may not be related directly to the interests of the nations which provides the troops? Motivations that will cause soldiers to take high risks need to be carefully considered. Interventions in tribal wars, therefore, should be treated more like police rather than military actions. How can this be handled in an effective manner? These are some unanswered questions that need to be dealt with in training military personnel for peace making and peace keeping missions. International training is particularly important; soldiers must receive training in languages, culture, and political understanding. The people participating in collective military interventions in tribal wars must properly take international relationships into account.
4. Rapid Identification of the Opposition
Before intervening, the United States must be able to rapidly determine who are the "bad guys" and where they are located. In addition, the United States also has to identify the "good guys," if there are any. It is sometimes difficult to tell the difference between the warring tribes. (INSERT PREPARING FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION SLIDES)
VIII. Military Action
In making the decision to intervene with military force in a tribal war, the political and military judgments that have been outlined must be combined. The most valuable commodity in these circumstances is hard knowledge. The president of the United States or the leadership of a coalition of nations must have the very best possible military intelligence to judge how best to use the military if a decision to intervene in a tribal war is made. The following considerations are important if a decision is reached to execute a military intervention:
1. The Military Objectives Need to Be Clearly Defined
This is necessary to judge the size and composition of the force that would be deployed in order to achieve the military objectives. Obviously, hard knowledge of military opposition in such a case is critically important.
2. Criteria for a Success Must Be Established
What would be considered as a successful outcome of a military intervention? What is the definition of victory? In doing this, a clear distinction must be made between peace making and peace keeping, which has already been mentioned. Without clear criteria for success, military interventions are likely to bog down in endless attrition, which is politically unacceptable.
3. An Accurate Estimate of the Capability of Opposing Forces Must Be Made
This is probably the single most important function that must be carried out by intelligence agencies of various nations involved in an intervention or by the intelligence agencies of the United States. What kind of weapons does the opposition have? Are there allies for the opposition that might lead to an expansion of the conflict? What are the logistics considerations? Can a potential opponent sustain a long conflict? These are all questions that need to be posed and answered in developing the strategy for peace making or peace keeping in a tribal war by military means.
4. An Exit Strategy Must Be Developed
Having intervened, how does a coalition or how does the United States get out of the situation? The example of Somalia is perhaps a good one here when contrasted with what happened in the Persian Gulf. In this case, the defeat of the Iraqi military and its destruction was the first objective. Once that was achieved, Kuwait could be liberated. Both of these objectives were achieved. In the case of Somalia, the initial objective was clear-to get food to people who were starving. Once this was achieved, the objective then escalated into taking sides in the tribal war going on between the various factions in Somalia. It was at this point that things became complicated. The United States finally had to withdraw its forces unilaterally because it was felt that the position had become politically untenable. The withdrawal of troops was probably not a good thing to do in the longer run. There will be more trouble in Somalia, and other interventions may be necessary.
There are a number of other important considerations that might be added to this list. Many of them hinge on logistics and the ability to sustain an intervening force. Once military action is initiated, then the most important thing is to make sure that the military commanders have good relationships and information channels to the political leadership. This is a particularly vital point if intervention is made by a multi-national force under the United Nations or NATO sponsorship. The sharing of intelligence is, probably in that case, the most sensitive matter since nations have a tendency to closely hold and protect their intelligence operations. Obviously, there must be sharing of intelligence in combat situations, and this is a new area for many military people. On the other hand, it may be necessary to develop intelligence products in such a way that unique sources, such as American satellite assets, are protected. There are complex questions here for which some operational doctrine needs to be developed, probably on an international basis.
Careful preparation for military intervention is probably the single most important item that needs to be understood, not only by people in the United States, but elsewhere in the world. Executing these preparations will require political understanding in such a way that popular support for intervention in tribal wars can be sustained. Without such an understanding and without public support, military interventions in tribal wars are likely to fail.
IX. Military Priorities for the Future
Given the leadership role that is likely to be played by the United States, it is important to list those things that the United States needs to do in order to be the effective leader in keeping the peace after the end of the Cold War. Therefore, it might be useful to conclude this paper by listing unilateral steps that the United States needs to take in the coming years.
1. The Enhancement of American Intelligence Services This is very definitely the single most important factor in developing the means to successfully intervene in tribal wars around the world. The military must make the intelligence field a more attractive career in order to attract and keep the quality personnel. It is most important that the military personnel have an accurate and deep knowledge of the history and culture of various regions around the world. A thorough understanding of this factor may be the difference between failure and success. Knowing local languages is also critically important if the United States is to intervene successfully in tribal wars in the future or act as a coalition leader. We must multiply by a large factor the number of people in this country who understand and who are comfortable with foreign languages. The United States has a very diverse population. However, this advantage, used by General Powell in Haiti and General Shalikashvili in Kurdistan, is rarely used to its full advantage.
Knowledge about both sides in a tribal war is also important. In that sense, the intelligence operations in Somalia were a failure. Such wars, from the viewpoint of the United States, may not have any logical "good guys" or "bad guys." The fact is that most tribal wars are those in which both sides have a case that can be reasonable to an outside person who has not been involved directly in the conflict. Thus, human intelligence, including a sophisticated analysis of open source information, is the first priority. Unfortunately, for various reasons the United Sates intelligence agencies have deteriorated in quality during the past decade. This trend must be reversed.
Technological intelligence retains its importance. This means that earth orbiting satellites and air based and ground based surveillance systems must continue to be developed using the most advanced technical means. Finally, the problem of sharing intelligence with allies and coalition partners has already been mentioned. It is important to develop means of doing this if interventions in tribal wars by coalitions are to succeed.
2. The Enhancement of Military Transportation
In order to be first at a trouble spot, military transport must be greatly expanded. This means building, perhaps, 100 or more of the new McDonnell-Douglas C-17 aircraft. This is very definitely the most capable military air transportation vehicle ever created. (The team that developed the C-17 won the Collier Trophy a few years ago for its technical excellence.) The C-17 aircraft is intended to be both a strategic and tactical airlifter which makes it particularly important. More McDonell-Douglas KC-10 tanker aircraft would also be useful. Special purpose aircraft such as the Bell-Boeing V-22 "Osprey" tiltrotor aircraft could easily become the sole means for dealing with situations in which no airfields are available. In addition to the development of military transports, making it easier to convert large Boeing 747-type civil transport aircraft for military missions is also extremely important. Air transport is only part of the problem. Bulk cargo and the people necessary to sustain a military force must ultimately be carried in ships and then deployed in trucks. In the case of sealift, a promising idea might be to convert some of the large American and Russian ballistic missile-carrying submarines (twenty "U.S. Ohio" class vessels and about thirty Russian "Typhoon" class ships) to troop and military cargo carriers. These submarines are large ships in excess of 20,000 tons when fully loaded, and they are very fast. One of them can probably carry up to 2,000 fully armed troops if suitably modified. Thus, these ships could carry large numbers of troops in a few days from their bases to any place else in the world, and because of their ability to do this submerged, they can achieve military surprise due to their stealthy nature. Their capacity and flexibility may, therefore, be particularly useful. Sealift also may require the conversion of civilian ships to military purposes. The British did that very successfully in the Falkland Islands War in 1982.
3. The Defense of United States Territory
For the first time since the incursion made by Pancho Villa in 1916 across the border to raid Columbus, New Mexico, the United States will have to pay serious attention to the defense of United States territory. A great many people around the world today hate the United States. This is a consequence of the fact that we are the remaining super power. We have intervened politically, culturally, economically, and of course, materially in various conflicts around the world and very often this inspires hatred. There is also a generalized hatred of "western" culture among a number of groups around the world. All of this means that direct attacks against United States territory are now more likely than they were in the past. This situation is made worse by the fact that high technology weapons including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons have spread around the world. Finally, the ease of transportation and communications makes it possible for people to get into the United States who do not wish us well and to do things that in terms of doing harm would not have been possible two decades ago.
The first priority is to develop defenses against attacks inside the United States by terrorist groups originating elsewhere. First, we must enhance the capabilities of local authorities to deal with such events. These authorities then will be supported by federal agencies including the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the National Guard. Technical support will be provided by a new agency in the Department of Defense, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. It is quite likely that by concentrating on this problem many effective defenses against terrorist attacks can be developed. In addition to defensive measures, other things must be accomplished. There is the ability to retaliate against the sources of terrorist activities. This was demonstrated in 1986 by mounting an air attack on Libya in retaliation for a terrorist bombing of U.S. soldiers stationed in Berlin. In the same way, facilities operated by the terrorist group headed by Osama bin Laden were destroyed in 1998 in response to the attack by bin Laden's group on U.S. Embassies in Kenya and in Tanzania. In addition to retaliatory actions, there is also the possibility now of taking effective international legal actions against terrorists. It is too early to tell whether an international legal system to deal with terrorists can actually be developed, but some recent efforts in that direction look promising.
The United States must also do more to develop defenses against attacks mounted from outside our borders. The enhancement of our air defense system should have first priority. Sometimes our air defense has been penetrated. Some years ago, a Cuban Air Force pilot who wished to defect to the United States flew a MIG-23 fighter aircraft across our border and landed at Homestead Air Force Base in Florida before anyone knew that he had penetrated our air space. The technology exists today to build a very effective air defense system and we should make the investment to do that. Space-based moving target indicators (MTI) would constitute a particularly promising method for making certain that we know when airplanes violate U.S. air space in an unauthorized manner. The technology that would be applied to create this air defense system would also automatically improve our civil air traffic control system. Such a system would not only enhance the safety of civil air travel, but also would make it possible to control worldwide air traffic in such a way that we could deal with any suspicious or clandestine flights.
The development of defense against ballistic missile-carrying nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons should also have a high priority. Because of the spread of these weapons and their delivery systems using ballistic missiles, all nations and regions of the world will eventually be under the threat of such attacks. Much technical progress has been made in the past few years in developing defenses against ballistic missiles. It is now feasible to build a system that could guard the territory of the United States against attacks by a modest number of ballistic missiles. Intelligence estimates are that possible adversaries might be able to mount attacks against the United States with something of the order of 100 missiles and defensive system against attacks are feasible. In addition, some of these defensive systems could be made available to allied nations across the world, and this might be an appropriate step in making the world safer against possible attacks by "rogue" nations or terrorist groups that possess these weapons. In the longer term it should be feasible to build a space-based antiballistic system that could shoot down ballistic missiles launched anywhere in the world, targeted against any nation in the world. The development of such a defensive system on an international basis might be very desirable.
Finally, the United States should tighten border controls to make certain that nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons are not smuggled across our borders. Once again, technical means exist that would make this particular function easier today than it was two decades ago. These measures should be taken in such a way that it is clearly understood. We are not excluding people from the United States. What we are doing is protecting ourselves against those people who would import dangerous weapons into the country in a clandestine way. It is most important to implement the measures that I have suggested in this section. Doing this will make the post-Cold War world safer for all of us so that the global village that Marshall McLuhan dreamed about thirty years ago can really come into existence. (INSERT MILITARY PRIORITIES FOR THE FUTURE SLIDES)
When Bill Wright asked me about one and a half years ago to participate in the Philosophical Society of Texas Annual Meeting for 1998, I thought I had a relatively easy task in covering the topic "Economic Warfare" or better yet economic global competition. The IC² Institute of The University of Texas at Austin had commissioned Dr. Piyu Yue and I to research global competition which resulted in a book published in 1997 entitled Global Economic Competition: Today's Warfare in Global Electronics Industries and Companies.
Our book covered a twenty-two-year period between 1970 and 1992.We reviewed economic efforts in twenty-two nations. We also examined fourteen industries based on electronic technologies and discussed methodology issues relative to the electronic technology chain and their clusters and comparative analysis based on data envelopment analysis. We extended our comparative analysis to 315 corporations within the clustering electronics industries which included electronic components, computer manufacturing, software, telecommunications equipment, industrial instruments, consumer electronics and four emerging industries. The company studies included the largest multinational corporations of Canada, Japan, South Korea, the United States, Germany, Great Britain, and other Western European countries. The time period covered 1982 through 1992. We compared company performance as well as the underlying factors for employment and labor productivity, asset utilization, cost efficiencies and R&D expenditure ratios. We also performed a core competitive analysis between the world's top twenty-six giant electronics companies with more than $10 billion of sales revenues in 1994.
The time period selected was 1985 to 1994. These time periods covered the formation of the European Community, ASEAN, and NAFTA. Also this time period covered the cold war as well as the transition to cold peace. It covered changes in the World Bank and IMF. Several economic cycles were included as well as changes in national political parties and leadership. Needless to say, Dr. Yue and I spent over four years on these studies.
Today's presentation will concentrate on economic warfare based on Fourth Industrial Revolution technologies. Thereby, I wish to present first, a summary of the lessons learned from Piyu's and my study on Global Economic Competition; second, a quick review of the growing importance of the high technology industry to the United States and Texas, and conclude with a call for Texas-based actions for leadership for the twenty-first century economic global competition.
Part I. Global Economic Competition: Today's Warfare in Global Electronics Industries and Companies.
Dr. Piyu Yue and I reached an early conclusion that there was no economic theory or models to analyze global economic competition for science and technology based industries. We found that global economic competition is a complex dynamic process that could not characterize economic competition among nations, particularly when economic theory and logic rely on restrictive assumptions that have drifted away from the reality of changing times. We settled on a deeper and more disaggregated approach to analyzing the competitive advantages of a nation's economy, its industries and its major companies. In the global technology-based marketplace we see fierce competition between clustering industries as well as among their firms. The final outcome of this competition profoundly determines a nation's economic status and the extent of its power within the international system. We emphasized comparative analysis at three levels; namely, relative performance between nations, between industries, and between firms.
Relative Performance of Nations from 1970-1992.
We compared the macroeconomic performance of twenty-two nations from 1970 to 1992 that were major exporters and/or importers of electronic products. The center of international economic gravity in the time period 1970-1992 was shared by the United States, Japan, and Germany. The average growth rates of real GDP is shown in Table 1 for selected nations. In the time period 1978 to 1991 Japan's average growth rate was almost twice that of the United States. However, the 1994 growth rate of the United States was eight times that of Japan. The Asian region nations' growth rates were higher than Japan's. In the 1985-95 period, Germany's and England's growth rates were higher than the United States. By 1994 the U.S. average growth rate of real GDP was higher than that of Germany and England. Please note that China's and Singapore's average growth rate for 1994 continued to grow while the other Asian countries' growth rates dropped.
GDP per capita is shown in Table 2. Please note that by 1991 Japan's and Germany's GDP per capita was higher than that for the United States. The average net export values are shown in Table 3. You will note that the U.S. international trade deficit increased throughout the period 1978-1994. In contrast, the Japanese international trade surplus increased over the same period.Germany's net international trade was a surplus over the same period.
Relative Performance by Industries.
Our study also analyzed the national competitive advantages and disadvantages within the global electronic industries. We used Michael Porter's competitive cluster techniques for fourteen electronics-based industries to represent a nation's competitive advantage. Our contribution was to develop a way to provide linkages among the electronics-based industries in terms of exports and imports. We called these linkages a "technology chain." (See Charts 1 and 2.) The period covered was from 1978 to 1990. Our study showed that Japan has developed the strongest electronic technology chain in the world for materials, components, industrial products and consumer goods. It was very evident that Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Malaysia, and Taiwan had devoted much effort to establishing their own electronic technology chains industry and had become aggressive competitors in the global marketplace. The study, as expected, showed that the United States initially developed the electronic technology chain but it lost share of markets to the Asian countries. However, the United States was still dominant in developing extensions to the electronic technology chain. In fact, the United States was dominant in three out of four of the newer industries-multimedia, information systems, flexible manufacturing systems, and management systems. Japan was dominant in one; namely, industrial robots.
What was clear for the study was that global national competition was driving the technology chain from a high technology business to a commodity business. (See Chart 3.) In other words the life cycle of technology products is short. As new and advanced products are launched on the market, the earlier generations become technologically and economically obsolete. What we have observed is that while the technology-based product/service cycle is short-under two years-it takes a nation some twenty to forty years to develop their technology-chain-based industries. For example, it took at least thirty years for the United States to develop Silicon Valley. The Japanese government funded over a decade of research and development to enter the computer manufacturing market.
Those corporations that successfully market and sell the most advanced products at any given point in time will experience spectacular growth rates-so-called hyper-growth. Economists have been late in recognizing this phenomenon, so characteristic of the technology economy. Conversely, corporations clinging to product laggards can see their markets collapse overnight, with disastrous results. The technology-based economy can become polarized into two camps: swarms of small start-up companies growing at phenomenal rates, and stumbling giants.
The high tech corporation is typically embarked on a dynamic path that is located far from equilibrium all the time. The orbit is nonlinear. It harbors the possibility of chaos.
In the resulting setting of industrial turmoil, there will occur rapid technological evolution. A kind of balance will be established between creativity and oblivion, between the commercialization of new products, the launching of new start-up companies, mergers and acquisitions, and bankruptcies.
Our comparative analysis at the firm level clearly indicated that the giant companies have been the gravity center of global economic competition. Their successes and failures impact the global marketplace, affecting international trade balances, employment, personal and national wealth and status, and, finally, the standard of living of present and future generations. In previous sections we observed that many excellent mid-sized electronics companies in the U.S. are out-performing Japanese and U.S. giant firms. Although mid-sized and small electronics companies have relatively limited human, financial, and technological resources, they compete aggressively with giant electronics companies in all the clusters, and expand rapidly. Their successes can change the future landscape of the global competition in the electronics industries. U.S. examples are Microsoft, Intel, and Dell.
I'd like to selectively review with you the comparative performance of the global giant electronics companies. There are twenty-six companies in all, each with consolidated sales revenues of more than $10 billion in 1992 except for a Korean company, Samsung Electronics, whose sales revenues were only $4.848 billion in 1992, but soared to $14.282 billion in 1994. This group includes ten companies based in the U.S., ten in Japan, two in Germany, and one each in France, the Netherlands, Sweden, and South Korea. The twenty-six giant companies are about 8.25 percent of the 315-company sample size studied. The sales revenues of the twenty-six-company group were $755.454 billion in 1992, accounting for 60.5 percent of total sales revenues of all the 315 sample companies, which spread over the entire electronic technology chain.
Comparative performance of these twenty-six giant firms by nation is shown in Table 4. The Japanese giant companies increased their relative share at the expense of the United States and Western European nations. A closer examination of ten U.S. giant companies would show eight of them lost relative share and only two increased their relative share. Behind the giant electronic companies relative share are many factors such as recessions, corporate strategy and other political, social and economic factors. However we examined their three input factors-labor, capital, and technology-used in different versions of economic growth theory. In the 1993-94 time period, the following conclusions can be made; namely,
Employment nine of the ten Japanese companies continued to increase their employment. eight of ten U.S. companies decreased their employment.
Total Assets All ten Japanese companies increased their total assets. five out of ten U.S. firms increased total assets.
R&D Expenditures seven out of ten Japanese companies increased their R&D expenditures. five out of ten U.S. firms increased R&D expenditures.
Japanese companies kept increasing their input factors throughout the period 1985-1994. It is particularly striking in the total employment increase of 690,000 people. In the same period the United States was downsizing by 532,000 peopleTotal assets of the Japanese companies increased by 4.0 times in the 1985-94 period while U.S. firms increased their assets by 2.87 times. R&D expenditures for U.S. firms also lagged Japanese R&D expenditures-1.3 times for U.S. firms to 3.8 times for Japanese firms. The comparison of the company level data clearly shows that rapid global expansion of the global Japanese electronics companies into a commodity market. In contrast, the U.S. electronics industry was concentrating on emerging market changes and profitability.
One major conclusion from our analysis of the twenty-six global giant companies was that new technologies are revolutionary because:
A. They reflect fundamental advances in science.
B. They are widely diffused. Consequently, many nations as well as regions and individuals will have increasing opportunities to develop and utilize these technologies for their own purposes.
C. They spur new industries and regenerate traditional industries.
D. They are creating new types of institutional alliances among academia, business, and government.
E. They require greater intellectual property protection.
F. They create new approaches and pose newer requirements that make existing skills and competencies obsolete. Furthermore, they significantly alter or create new consumption/behavior patterns."
Part II. Power Shift.
General Butler, Dr. Mark, and Mr. O'Neill have touched on the changing external threats, military actions, and terrorism. They clearly established the changing nature of our national security. Part I of this paper has recognized that economic security is also important for national security. In the past, I have referred to this concept as comprehensive security. But what many of us see is a power shift. The challenges are more than changes in worldwide markets and economic growth. It is more than the challenge of utilizing revolutionary dual technology for comprehensive security. The challenge is more how to create wealth and prosperity at home and abroad in times of cold peace. If I could pick the most significant lesson that I have learned from our comparative nations study regarding warfare in global electronic industries and companies, I would say that entrepreneurial leadership makes it possible to get on and stay on the leading economic edge. Entrepreneurial leadership is not entrepreneurship at a firm level be it a start-up or a progressive 200-year-old multinational firm. It is the need for creative and innovative leaders of all sectors-academic, private, government, and the foundation sectors. How they all work for the common good of all people in a caring and sharing way is the key. I firmly do not believe entrepreneurial leadership can be attained through government promotion and protection, or government targeted industries and incentives.
In the past year, I have had numerous occasions to observe and discuss at home, in China, in Japan, and in Eastern Europe how to build a civil society. At the core of these discussions I've observed what Jessica T. Mathews has called a "power shift." (See Charts 4 and 5.)
In the past, comprehensive security was focused at the Federal level. However, power shifts place the emphasis on communities, global or local. My good friends, Dr. and Mrs. Rostow, have taught me that if you can't handle the problem at a local community level you can develop a global community.
In the United States, high technology is the single largest industry by sales. In 1996 total high tech sales were $866 billion in five industry clusters. (See Charts 6 and 7.) U.S. high tech sales have increased 37 percent from 1990 to 1996. U.S. high tech sales surpass U.S. auto manufacturing and construction revenues. (See Chart 8.) U.S. high technology service revenues have surpassed electronics manufacturing since 1991, software and computer-related services are the most dynamic segments. All high technology manufacturing segments except defense electronics continue to grow. High technology is the nation's leader in R&D expenditures-$40 billion in 1995 or thirty percent of all R&D expenditures. The high tech R&D growth since 1990 is 42 percent.
Texas is more high tech than most of its citizens realize. In 1996
* Texas was the second ranked high tech state in both exports and employment. (See Charts 9 and 10.)
* Texas added over 69,000 high tech jobs between 1990 and 1996 to make it the leading state.
* Fifty-one of every 1,000 private sector workers in Texas are employed by high technology firms.
* Texas's high tech industry employs more than oil and gas drilling, agriculture and petroleum refining. (See Chart 11.)
* Texas's average high technology industry wages are 57 percent above Texas's other average private sector wages.
* Texas's high technology industry employment is primarily in communication services, semiconductors, software services, data processing and computers, and office equipment manufacturing. (See Chart 12.)
* A major challenge for Texas's high technology is to develop the border region. (See Chart 13.)
Part III. Texas's Call to Action
For Texas to continue to be economically and globally competitive we need to address three key issues. (See Chart 14.)
First. Provide entrepreneurial leadership at the community level for the power shift. This leadership must be caring and sharing. (See Chart 15.) Therefore, this leadership must come from within the community. The community must provide the necessary civic entrepreneurship infrastructure that commercializes revolutionary technologies.
Second. The community leadership must provide for proactive state research bases. (See Chart 16.) The community leadership must make sure that Texas gets its fair share of the Federal research budget. The entrepreneurial leaders must make sure that each community region in our state has its share of research and development-academic and private. We must stay on the cutting edge of commercializing technology for the emerging global markets including building global alliances.
Third. Improve the workforce development programs from entry skills, through technicians as well as the science, engineering, and management professions. (See Chart 17.) This will require more than traditional education and private-sector training. In short, we need to evolve certificates of competencies that are timely and provide sufficient numbers of individuals when needed and where needed.
Entrepreneurial leadership requirements are shown in Chart 18. All individuals need to have opportunities, e.g., jobs, skills and competencies as well as appropriate recognition of their contributions. The community leadership needs to integrate its economic, cultural, political, and technology sectors. Entrepreneurial community leadership must come from partnerships between the academic, business, government, and foundations sectors.
In conclusion, I'd like to quote my good friend Dr. Skip Porter: (See Chart 19.)